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Real Interest Rates: WhatAccounts
for Their Recent Rise?
A. Steven Holland
OMINAL interest rates have risen to unprece-
dented levels in the last five years, and the common
perception is that expected real rates of interest —
rates minus expected inflation — have risen as well.
These higher rates are blamed for a variety of eco-
nomic ills including reduced capital investment and
slowdowns in such interest-sensitive sectors as hous-
ing and automobiles.
Thispaper is concerned, first,with establishing that
realinterestrates haveindeed been higher during the
1980s than in the previous two decades and, second,
with examining possible causes of this major shift.
Potential causes include changes in the expected rate
ofinflation, monetarypolicy, the state oftheeconomy,
taxes, federal budget deficits andthedeclining relative
priceofenergy.
ESTIMATES OF BEFORE- AND
AFTER-ThX REAL INTEREST BATES
The real interest rate is not known with certainty at
the time a security is purchased, but the purchaser
has an expectation ofit. The nominal interest rate, i, is
the sumof the expected realrate of interest, r,and the
expected rateofinflation, fr:
(1) i = r + ~‘.‘
The expected realrate, thus, can be estimated accord-
ing to the formula:
(2) r = i — fr,
as long as an estimate of the expected inflation rate is
available.
A. Steven Hollandis an economist at the Federal Reserve Bankof St.
Louis. Jude L. Naes, Jr., provided research assistance.
‘This equption itt a’widely used approximation of the “Fisher equa-
tion.” See Fisher (1965).
Proxies for the expected rate ofinflation frequently
are based on weighted averages of past inflation rates
or the predicted values from regression equations in
which the inflation rate depends on past inflation
rates, past rates of money growth and a number of
othervariables.’Because empirical results can be sen-
sitive to assumptions about the way expectations are
formed, however, a potentially morefruitful approach
is to use “observed” inflation forecasts to estimate
expected inflation.’ Inthis article, datafrom surveys of
both short- and long-term inflation expectations are
used to estimate short- and long-term expected real
rates of interest.
This analysis oversimplifies the problem, since it
applies only to the expected real before-tax yield.
Sinceinterest payments are taxable asearned income,
the expected real after-tax yield )r*) is:
(3)r~ = i — ti —
= (1—Ui —
where t is the marginal tax rate. An estimate of the
average marginal tax rate on personal income is used
belowto estimateexpected after-tax realinterest rates.
The estimatespresented in this article are intended
to represent the pattern of recent real interest rate
movements, not to provide completely accurate esti-
mates of real interest rates at any point in time. Poten-
tial sources oferror in the estimates include (but are
not limited to): (a) measurement error in calculating
the expectedrate ofinflation, (b) theeffects ofdifferent
‘As pointed outby Santoni and Stone (1982), however, the difficulty
with this procedure is that any change in economic policy or any
structural change or “shock” that affects inflation expectations will
not be incorporated in theestimate ofexpected inflation.
‘For an example of the sensitivity of empirical results to assumptions
about expectations formation, see Holland (1984).
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NOTE: Dashed lines represent overage levels of before- and after-tax real interest rates over selected
time periods.
marginal tax rates across market participants and (c)
the difference between the marginal tax rate expected
to holdat the time interest payments are receivedand
the current rate.4 Whenever real interest rates are re-
ferred to in the following discussion, it will mean cx-
pected real interest rates.
Estimates ofShort-Term Real
Interest Rates
Chart 1 plots nominal returns and estimates of the
before-and after-tax realreturns on one-yearTreasury
securities, based on one-year inflation forecasts from
41n addition, the return that is relevant for decision-making depends
on riskand thetax burden on alternative uses of funds. More will be
said about risk later in the article. See Ezrati (1982) and Mehra
(1984) for discussions of the implications of taxes on alternative
uses offunds.
the Livingston survey from 1960 to the first half of
1984.’ Between 1960 and 1970, the nominal rate rose
from around 3 percent to over 7 percent. Estimates of
‘Joseph Livingstonof The Philadelphia Inquirerconducts a surveyof
economists each springand fall, requesting respondentsto indicate
their predictions of the consumer price index (CPI). Because the
survey results published, for example, in June contain predictions
for the following Decemberand June, Livingston refers tothem as
six-and 12-month-ahead forecastsasthis article does. Becausethe
respondents to the June survey are thought to know only theApril
CPI, however, they are actuallypredicting eight- and 14-month rates
of change. For a detailed discussion ofthe Livingston expectations
data, see Carlson (1977). This article uses the data in Carlson’s
revised form updated to the present. The nominal interest rates
used in the charts and table are the quarterly averages ofthe rates
for the quarter in which the Livingston survey was taken. The same
calculations were made for six-month Treasury bills based on six-
month inflation forecasts. Since the pattern of movements was
nearlyidentical, however, only theone-year rates are reported. The
estimate oftheaverage marginal tax ratecomes from Chase Econo-
metrics.
Percent
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the expected realrate indicate this was dueprimarily
to higher expected inflation, since both the before-
and after-tax real rates appear to have risen only
slightly, ifat all, overthe period.
Between 1971 and 1980,short-term nominal interest
rates, on average, weremuch higher thanin the 1960s;
real rates, for the most part, were tower. In fact, esti-
mated before-tax realrates were below 1 percent from
thesecond halfof1974to the first halfof1978 andwere
even negative in late1976 and early 1977. After-taxreal
rates were negative for nearly the entire period from
1974 to 1980. Nominal rates increased dramatically
after 1977, with increases of about 200 basis points
occurring in late 1978 and again in late 1979. These
increases, however, served only to bring real rates
closer to the levels that had prevailed before 1974.
From late 1979 to early 1982, short-term nominal
interestrates were higher than at any time during the
1960sor1970s. Short-term realinterest rates, however,
did not break with precedent until 1981 when before-
tax real rates climbed above the 6 percent level; they
continued to rise through early 1982. After-tax real
rates behaved in a similar fashion and, on average,
havebeen higher since 1981 than in the previous two
decades. Thedifference isnot as great, however,as it is
for before-tax real rates. Both nominal and real rates
havedeclined since early1982,but theyremain at very
high levels relative to past history.
Estimates ofLong-Term Real
Interest Rates
We expect long-term realinterest rates to behave in
a manner broadly similar to short-term real rates; if
short-term rates rise, long-term rates areforced up so
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tile whether one holds short- or long-term bonds.’
Because of data limitations, however, it is much more
difficult to get an accurate representation ofthe mar-
ket’s expectation of inflation over the distant future
thanoverthe near future! In fact, it isonly since 1978
that a survey of expected inflation over periods sub-
stantially longerthanayearhas beenundertaken. The
survey, known as the Decision-Makers Poll, provides
estimates of expected inflation overthe next five and
10years.’
‘This assumes theabsence of segmentedmarkets. In other words.
there is a high degree of substitutability between short- and long-
term securities. This is not meant to implythat the term structure of
interest rates does not change over time, only that short- and long-
term interest rates behave in a broadly similarfashion.
71t is also more difficult to know the appropriate tax rate to use in
calculating the after-tax yield, since interest payments are made
much farther in the fUture.
‘Richard Hoey ofDrexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., conducts this sur-
vey ofinstitutional portfolio managers. Each respondent predicts the
rate ofchange of consumerprices over the next five years and over
the five subsequent years. The average of the two provides the
estimate ofexpected inflation over the next 1(1 years.
Since 1980, the survey hasbeen conducted at least fourtimes a
year. To facilitate comparison with the shorter-term real interest rate
estimates, we usedata from surveys taken as close as possible to
the dates ofthe Uvingston surveys. There is never more than one
month’s difference in the dates of the surveys oftheshort- and long-
term inflation expectations used in this paper. In 1978 and 1979,
there was only one survey in each year (taken nearthemiddleofthe
year). These two surveys provided data for the estimates of long-
term inflation expectations for the first halves of 1978 and 1979.
Estimates forthe second halves of both years were calculated by
interpolation.
Chart 2 plots the nominal yield on 10-yearTreasury
securities since 1960, as well as estimates of the 10-
year, before- and after-tax real rates since 1978 based
on the mean inflation forecasts from the survey. As
expected, the pattern of movements in long-term
nominal rates during the 1960s and 1970s is similar to
that in short-term rates. In particular, when short-
term nominal rates shot upward in the late 1970s, so
did long-term nominal rates - Long-term real rates also
reached heights comparable to those of short-term
real rates in 1981 and 1982? Thus, it appears that the
increase in long-term real rates occurred at roughly
the same time and was of roughly equal size as the
increase in short-term real rates.
The Term Structure ofReal
Interest Rates
Nominal long-term rates have been substantially
above nominal short-term rates since 1982, reversing
the pattern from the late 1970s and early1980s. This is
illustrated in column 1 of table 1, which gives the
difference between theyields on 10-year and one-year
Treasury securities since 1978. Comparable differ-
ences for before- and after-tax real rates, respectively,
are presented in columns 2 and 3 of the table.
The estimated real term structure tells an entirely
different story than the nominal term structure. There
‘Five-year rates exhibited a similar pattern.
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is, for the most part, very little difference between
short- and long-term real rates. In other words, the
real “yield curve” — therelationship between the term
to maturity and therealrateofinterest on securities —
has been much flatter in recent years than the nomi-
nal yield curve. The average absolute difference be-
tweenthe one- and 10-yearnominal ratesfrom 1978 to
1984 is 109 basis points; forbefore-tax real rates, it is 58
basis points, while for after-tax real rates it is 59 basis
points. These figures imply that long-term real rates
have not differed substantially from short-term real
rates in recent years.”
WHY DID REAL INTEREST
HATES RISE?
The real interest rate is determined by the interac-
tion of the supply of and demand for loanable funds.
The quantity of funds available for lending (the quan-
tity supplied) increases as the real rate of interest in-
creases. The quantity that people wish toborrow (the
quantity demanded) decreases as the real rate in-
creases. The equilibrium realrate is that forwhich the
quantity demanded and quantity supplied are equal.
10Notice that long-term inflation expectations were substantiallylower
than short-term inflation expectations from 1978 to earty 1981, a
period of predominantly rising inflation. This pattern has been re-
versed for late 1981 throughearly 1984, a period ofgenerally declin-
ing inflation.
In figure 1, this occurs at the real rate rr, where S
represents the supply curve and D represents the de-
mand curve. Factors that affect the positions of the
supply anddemand curves determine the equilibrium
rate. Potentially, these factors include the expected
rate ofinflation, monetary policy, the state ofthe econ-
omy, taxes, federal budget deficits and the declining
relative price of energy. The potential impact of each
of these factors on real interest rates is discussed
below.
Expected Inflation
We know that expected inflation affects nominal
interest rates. In fact, our real rate estimates are de-
rived by subtracting the expected inflation rate from
the nominal interest rate. Changes in expected in-
flation, however, also have the potential to alter real
interest rates. One reason, associated with Mundell
(1963), is that higher expected inflation causes people
to transfer part of their assets from money to (higher)
interest-earning assets, thereby increasing the supply
of loanable funds and driving down the real interest
rate. This occurs because money provides a very low
or negative real return during times of inflation,
whereas the return on interest-earning assets gener-
ally keeps better pace with expected inflation. A simi-
lar notion, associated with Tobin (1965), is thathigher
expected inflation causes people to shift part of their
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investment in capital that ultimately depresses the
marginal return on capital, reducing the demand for
loanablefunds and the realinterest rate.
An additional argument, based on the effect of ex-
pected inflation on the return to capital investment, is
associated with Feldstein and Summers (1978): Higher
inflation drives up the replacement cost of capital,
while current tax lawprovides for depreciation allow-
ances for businesses based on the historical cost of
capital. Therefore, higherexpected inflation results in
a lower expected real return on capital investment,
reducing the demand for loanable funds and, conse-
quently, thereal interest rate.
These effects are illustrated in figure 2.The Mundell
effect shifts the supply curve from S, to S. (an increase
in supply), resulting in a decline in the equilibrium
real rate of interest from r~ to r. Similarly, the Tobin
and the Feldstein-Summers effects shift the demand
curve from D, to D, (areduction in demand), resulting
ina decline in r’ (to r ifboth shifts occur).
There is, however, a potential positive effect of ex-
pected inflation on the real interest rate that works
through the personal income tax system.” Under the
assumption that people try to malntain a constant
after-tai real rate, higher expected inflation leads to
higher before-tax real interest rates since taxes are
assessed on the nominal return.” Thus, the higherthe
nominal return, the greater the spread between the
before- and alter-tax real rates, all other things equal.
The widening ofthe spread between before-and after-
tax real rates as the nominal interest rate increases
can be seen in chart 1, where the averages of the
before-and after-tax realrates for the periods 1960—70,
1971—80 and 1981—84 are given by the dashed lines.
Therefore, with the combination of the Mundell-
Tobinand Feldstein-Summers effectsand the income
tax effect, it is not possible to say a priori whether an
increase in expected inflation leadsto higheror lower
before-tax realinterest rates, although we expect it to
“See Dathy (1975) and Feldstein (1976).
“To see this consider that
r = (I -t)i — fr
and that a constant after-tax real return, r, implies that
Ar’ = (1 —t~Ai Afr = 0.
Therefore,
At = (1/1 —I) Afr.
With the tax rate, t, between 0 and 1, this impliesthat the change in
the nominal interest rate, ~i, is greater than the change in the
expected inflation rate, Afr. If thetax structure is progressive, then
higher expected inflation results in an even wider spread between
before- and after-tax real rates.
cause lower after-tax real rates.” From 1960 to 1980,
the correlation between expected inflation and both
before- and after-tax real rates on one-year Treasury
securities was negative and statistically significant:
—0.38 for the before-tax rate and —0.81 for the after-
tax rate. Thisprovides support for the Mundell-Tobin
and Feldstein-Summers effects. From 1981 to 1984,
however,the correlation has actually been positive for
the before-taxrate andessentially zerofor theafter-tax
rate. The same is true for the correlation between
inflation expectations and long-term real rates over
the 1981—84 period.’4 Furthermore, during the period
ofrapidly rising realrates from 1980 to 1982, long-term
inflation expectations were also rising. Thus, though
theevidence on the effectofexpected inflation on real
interest rates from simple correlations is mixed, it
does not appear that changes in expected inflation
were a major factor in the recent rise in real interest
rates.
Monetary Policy
Theeffect ofmonetarypolicy onrealrates ofinterest
is a subject of considerable controversy. Textbooks
typically describe the impact of an increase in money
supply on the real rate as follows: An increase in the
money supply relative to money demand creates an
excess supply of money; in response, individuals in-
crease their purchases of securities and goods until
the interestrate declines byenough to inducethem to
hold the larger amount ofmoney. Thus, the supply of
loanable funds increases, drivingdown the real inter-
est rate. Furthermore, an expansionary monetary pol-
icy leadsto short-term increases in realincome dueto
the increased demand for goods, which has two ef-
fects that influence real rates in opposite directions
(1) the level of savings increases, putting downward
pressure on the real rate, and (2) the demand for
money increases, causing the real rateto rise,”
One consequence of increasing the growth rate of
the money supply, however, is a rise in future rates of
inflation and also inexpected future rates of inflation.
“See Makin and Tanzi (1983).
“The correlation coefficients for 1981—84 are: for the one-year
before-taxreal rate, 0.48; fortheone-year after-tax real rate, —0.06;
for the 10-year before tax real rate, 0.38; for the 10-year after-tax
real rate, —0.04.
“For more detail, see Santoni and Stone, and Brown and Santoni
(1983). The theory ofrational expectations states that a fully antici-
pated change in the money supply will have no effect on real interest
rates. When people forecast money growth and future inflation in an
optimal manner—by using all ofthe information currently available
atsufficiently lowcost — thenthemonetaryauthority is powerless to
affect real behavior of any kind unless it is able to fool the public.
This implies that only an unanticipated change in money supply
affects the real interest rate. See Fischer(1980).
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Therefore, theeffect ofincreased growth ofthe money
supply on nominal rates is likely to be positive in the
long run even if its immediate effect on real rates is
negative.
Empirical evidence suggests that there is little, if
any, long-term effect of changes in the money supply
on realinterest rates. Haferand Hem (1982) found that
an initial negative effect of higher money growth on
estimates of real interest rates was completely offset
one quarter later. Similarly, Santoni and Stone (1982)
found noevidence to linkmoneygrowth andrealrates
overthe longterm.”
Chart 3 plots the two-quarter growth rate of Ml
along with our estimate of the before-tax realinterest
“Carlson (1982) actually finds a weak positiveassociation between
money growth and real interest rates.
rateon one-year Treasury securities. The firstpoint to
make is that the correlations between money growth
and the real interest rate series are negligible for the
sample period used in the chart.’7 tt is true, however,
that realrates ofinterest began to risein 1980 just after
a tremendous reduction in two-quarter Ml growth.
This reduction was followed by an equally large in-
crease inMl growth,but realinterest rates continued
to climb nonetheless.
The data illustrated in the chart suggest another
possible role formonetarypolicy in thedetermination
7The correlation coefficient for two-quarter Ml growth and the be-
fore-tax real interestrate on one-year Treasury securities for 1960—
84 is 0.076. Thecorrelation between money growth and the before-
tax real 10-year rate for 1978—84 is —0.071 - Correlationswith the
after-tax yields on the same securities for the same time periods are
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of real interest rates: more variable money growth
leads to higher real rates. The explanation for this is
that the instability created by highly variable money
growth makes for increased uncertainty about future
returns on both short- and long-term interest-earning
assets and capital and raises the demand for money
relativeto these assets. This is, in effect, areduction in
the supply of loanable funds, which causes an in-
crease in real interest rates.’8
Anotherway to state this is: lenders, ifthey are risk-
averse, require that agreater “risk premium” be added
to interest rates in order to offset the greater uncer-
tainty associated with the future realreturn.” The ef-
fectof monetaryvariability on realinterest rates is not
completely unambiguous, however, since risk-averse
borrowers reduce theirdemand for loanable funds as
uncertainty increases. A recent empirical study by
Mascaro and Meltzer (1983) suggests that the overall
effect ofmonetary variabilityon nominal interest rates
is positive. Since the variability of money growth
should not affect expected inflation, it follows that the
effect on realinterest rates ispositive as well.”
A casual glance at chart 3 suggests that money
growth became substantially more variable in 1980,
the same yearthat real rates of interest began to rise.
The standard deviation of two-quarter Ml growth is
substantially higher for 1980—84 than for 1960—79, 4.1
percent compared with 2.5 percent. The source of
greater monetaryvariability is an unsettled issue, but
many analysts attribute it to the change in Federal
Reserve operating procedure that occurred inOctober
1979.” other events also may have contributed to the
rise in monetaryvariabilityincluding the innovationin
financial markets )such as the introduction of NOW,
Super NOWand money marketdeposit accounts) and
the imposition andremoval ofcredit controls in 1980.”
Thus, it appears that an increase in thevariability of
money growth in 1980 contributed to the increase in
“See Friedman and Schwartz (1963).
“Theanalysis assumes that it is not possible to diversify one’s hold-
ings in a manner that completely offsets the greaterriskassociated
with monetary variability.
“Mascaroand Meterestimate the variabilityofunanticipated money
growth, which turns outto be highlycorrelated with the variability of
actual money growth.
“The Federal Reserve announcedon October 6, 1979, it would place
less emphasis on confining variations in the federal funds rate and
more emphasis on reserve aggregates as a sign of its commitment
to longer-run restraint on money growth.
“See Hafer (1984) for a discussion of howfinancial innovations may
have affected the accuracy of Ml as a measure of transaction
balances.
real rates of interest that occurred in 1980 and 1981.
Furthermore, there is as yet no indication that the
short-mn instability of money growth was much af-
fected one way or another by the Federal Reserve’s
shift toamore judgmental operatingprocedure in the
fall of1982, and realinterest rates have yet to return to
their pre-1981 levels.”
The State ofthe Economy
When the economy enters a recession, business
firms experience excess capacity, and the need for
additional capital is reduced. A reduction in both the
demand for loanable funds and the realrate of interest
follows. As the economy recovers, some firms begin to
push toward their capacity constraints, requiring ad-
ditional investment and increasing the demand for
funds. Thus, higherreal interest rates tend to accom-
pany an expansion.
Chart 4plots a measure of the amount of “slack” in
the economy, the GNP gap, alongwith our estimate of
the before-tax real rate on one-year Treasury securi-
ties. The evidence suggests that the state of the econ-
omy helps to explain movements in real interest rates
both before and after the,recent upward shift in real
rates, but the shift itself appears to have little to do
with overall economic conditions. The GNP gap has a
correlation of —0.56 with the before-tax real rate for
theperiod 1960—80, and — 0.44 for 1981—84.”
“As evidence that the money supply continues to be highly variable,
consider thebehavior of Ml during 1983 and 1984. Ml grew during
thefirst two quarters of 1983 at a 12.8 percent rate and during the
second two quartersof 1983 at a 7.3 percent rate. Similarly, in 1984
the growth rate of Ml was 6.8 percent in the firsthalf of the year,
compared with —0.4 percent from JunetoOctober.
It is generally recognized that the Federal Reserve altered its
operating procedure again in late 1982-Thepost-1982 procedure is
not the same as the pre-1979 procedure, however. See Wallich
(1984). Another effect of the 1979 change in operating procedure
was an increase in the day-to-day variability of nominal interest
rates, which adds an additionalelement ofriskin securities markets.
This increased variability occurred in late 1979, however, while real
interest rates did not begin to rise until late 1980. In addition, the
federaloverride of state usury ceilings effective in March 1980 may
have contributed somewhat to higher real interest rates, although
there is no reasonto think this action would push real rates to levels
higher than those during previous periods (such as most of the
1960s and eariy 1970s) when these ceilings were not binding.
“The measure of the GNP gap is the difference between potential
and actual GNP ascalculated by the Council of Economic Advisers.
To get data for 1984, potential GNP was assumed to grow at its
averagerate for 1960—83, 3.44 percent. For the 10-year before-tax
real rate, the correlation for 1981 —84 is —0.55. For after-tax real
rates, the correlations are —0.62 forthe 1960—80 period and —0.13
for the 1981—84 period fortheone-yearrate and —0.37for the 1981—
84 period for the 10-year rate.
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Business Ta’tes
As noted above, thehigherthe return on investment
in physical capital, the greater the demand for loan-
able funds. A tax on business profits reduces the real
return on investment and the demand for loanable
funds, thereby lowering real interest rates. A tax on
business profits is not the onlybusiness tax that af-
fects investment and the real interest rate, however.
Businesses often receive tax credits or deductions
from taxable income for certain types of investment
expenditures. Furthermore, tax deductions to offset
the depreciation ofcapital equipment and structures
can affectthe investment decision andreal rates, since
these depreciation allowances may ormay not reflect
the true depreciation of the capital. Ifthe allowances
overstate the depreciation overa period of time, they
tend to spur additional investment, driving up the
demand for loanable funds and the real rate of inter-
est. If allowances provide for smaller deductions than
the actual loss from depreciation, they hinder invest-
ment and realrates are reduced.”
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was de-
signed to spur investment, primarily by altering the
wayin whichdepreciation is treated for tax purposes.
The magnitude ofthe effect ofthe act on investment is
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that it spurredinvestment spending. Forinstance, the
growth rate of real nonresidential fixedinvestment as
a percentage of real GNP was 8.7 percent over the
expansionary periodfrom thefourth quarter of1982 to
the second quarter of1984, up from an averageofonly
1.5 percent oversimilarperiods following the previous
six recessions.’6
One problem, however, with concluding that the
new tax legislation is a primary cause of higher inter-
est rates is that the legislation was not passed until
August 1981 (although its provisions were retroactive
to the beginning of 1981), while the shift in real rates
began in 1980 and was mostly complete by August
1981. For this legislation to have been the primary
factor in the recent rise in realinterest rates, the pass-
age of the legislation must have been predicted and
the demand for loanable funds increased many
months in advance as the predicted future return on
capital investment rose. On the other hand, this legis-
lation could have contributed both to the rise in real
rates that occurred in late 1981 and early 1982 in the
face of a severe recession and to the maintenance of
relatively high real interest rates right up to the
present.
Federal Budget Deficits
Government borrowing represents an increase in
the total demand for loanable funds. This suggests
that real interest rates rise as the size of the govern-
ment budget deficit increases in realterms. One rarely
sees a positive correlation between the size ofdeficits
and thelevels ofinterest rates, however.Thisisproba-
bly because they respond in opposite directions to
changes in economic conditions; deficits tend to rise
during businessrecessions and fallduring expansions
(because tax revenues and outlays for transfer pay-
ments aresensitive to the state ofthe economy), while
interest rates typically fall during recessions and rise
during expansion&’7
As for the recent rise in realinterest rates, it is clear
fi’om chart S that the recent dramatic increase in the
cyclically adjusted budget deficit did not occur until
late 1982, by which time real and nominal interest
rates had begun to fall. A closer look at the chart
‘°Thesix previous expansionary periods were lV/1949—Il/195l,
Il/1954—lV/i 955, 11/1 958—IV/1959, l/1961—lll/1962, IV/1970—II/1972
and I/i 975—Ill/i97& The difference between the growth of the
investment-ONP ratio in the current recovery and the average
growth in the six previous recoveries is statistically significant.
‘See Tatom (1984).
indicates that two major increases in the size of the
cyclically adjusted deficit have occurred in recent
years: one in 1975 and the other in 1982. Neither was
associated with rising real interest rates.
Thisdoes not necessarily imply that deficits have no
effect on real interest rates. Since interest rates are
based on expectations, expected future deficits could
have an impact on today’s real interest rates. If one
assumes the budget projections of the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) are representative of the market’s
expectation of future deficits, however, then deficit
projections do not appear to have been the major
instigator of the recent rise in real interest rates. The
CR0 report published in July 1981 projected a 1982
deficit ofless than $30 billion andsurpluses in thenext
fouryears growing to over$200 billion by 1986.”Recall
that at thetime this report was written, our estimates
of both short- and long-term before-tax real interest
rates were already far in excess of historical norms
and after-taxrealrates hadrisen tonear theirprevious
peaks. By February 1982, the CR0 had altered its pro-
jections and was predicting a deficit of nearly $200
billion in 1983, growing to nearly $300billion by 1987?’
YeL 1982 was ayear ofgenerally falling realand nomi-
nal interest rates.” Like the change in the tax laws,
however, expectations of future deficits may be help-
ing to keep real interest rates at levels that are quite
high relative to past history.
Declining Relative PriceofEnergy
Finally, it has been suggested that drastic increases
in the relative price of energy contributed to the low
realinterestrates ofthe 1970s,which would imply that
the generally falling relative price of energy of the
198os has contributed to higher real interest rates.”
The argument is that the demand for capital fell dur-
ing the 1970sbecause of a reduction in the supply of
“CongressionalBudget Office (1961). Carlson (1983) discussespos-
siblesources of bias in theCBO’s budgetprojections.
“Congressional Budget Office (1982). In discussing thereasons for
the change in the outlcok on the deficits between 1981 and 1963,
the CongressionalBudget Office (1983, p. 18) saysthat, ‘Over the
entire five-year period, 60 percent of the change in outlook from
budgetsurpluses tobudgetdeficits can be attributed tothefailure of
the economyto perform as projected two years ago.” In addition, it
says (p. 20) that, “Legislativeactions are thesecond largest reason
fordifferences between the two baselines, accounting forabout 30
percent of the change overthe five-yearperiod.”
“It is possible that higher projected government budgetdeficits lead
to greater expected inflation, in which case higher deficits would
cause higher nominal, butnot necessarily real, interest rates.
“See Wilcox (1983).
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complementary energy inputs, which resulted in re-
duced demand for loanable funds and lower real in-
terest rates?’
Once again, however, the timing ofthe recentrise in
real interest rates fails tolend credence to the theory.
During the period of most rapidly rising real interest
rates in 1980and thefirst halfof1981,the relativeprice
of ener~iwas still rising rapidly as a result of the
second oil crisis; thegrowth rateofthe relativepriceof
energybetween IV/1979 and 1111981 was 18.3percent.”
“See Tatom (1979) for a discussion of the impactofenergy shocks
on investment.
“The measure ofthe relative price of energy is the producerprice
index for ‘fuels and related products and power” divided by the
businesssectordeflator.
Reductions in the relative price ofenergy did notbe-
gin until late 1981, after most of the increase in real
interest rates alreadyhad occurred.
CONCLUSIONS
The 1980s have seen unprecedented behavior in
several keyeconomicvariables, themost notablebeing
interest rates. According to estimates of real interest
rates based on surveys of expected inflation, both
short- and long-term real rates rose to record levels
in 1981 and 1982 and, although they have declined
somewhat since then, have not returned to the levels
of the 1960sand 1970s.
A comparison of estimates of before- and after-tax
real interest rates indicates that the overall pattern of
Deficit
SCALEe
4 SCALE Before-tax real rate
~
II II I I
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their movements has been similar. The spread be-
tween the before- and after-tax real rates increased
overmuchofthesample, however,asnominal interest
rates (and expected inflationl increased. Therefore,
after-tax real interest rates have not been nearly as
high relative to previous experience as before-tax real
rates. Nonetheless, they have been higheron average
than they were in the 1960sand much higher than in
the 1970s.
The phenomenon most closely coincident with the
rise in real rates was an increase in the variability of
money growth, which increased economic uncer-
tainty and the risk premium on interest rates. Major
changes incurrent and projected governmentbudget
deficits and intax policieshappened after much ofthe
upward shift in real interest rates already had oc-
curred, but may have contributed to some additional
upward movement. Changes in economic conditions
bave been a major influence on the movement ofreal
interest rates since 1981; periods of slow growth or
recession have produced failing real rates, while ex-
pansions havepushed realrates upward.
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